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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
REMINGTON RAND, INC., a corporation,
Respondent and Plaintiff,

-vs.THURMAN E. O'NEIL and LOIS S.
MACHADO, fdba A-1 TYPEWRITER COMPANY,
Defendants,
-vs.-

Case No. 8379

DALE E. GRANT and UTAH CASH
REGISTER EXCHANGE, INC., a
corporation,
Appellants and Garnishee Defendants.
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND ~fOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT
THE RECORD, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
THEREOF
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
Respondent, Remington Rand, Inc., a corporation,
petitions the Court for a rehearing in this case upon the
grounds hereinafter set forth.
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:RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO AMEND AND
SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD
Respondent, under Rules 4 (h) .and 5 (a), U. R. C. P.,
moves the Court for leave to amend the record and, under Rule 75 (h), U. R. C. P., to supplement the record
as hereinafter set forth:
1. To amend the record by inserting a Certificate
of Mailing on its Reply to Answers of Garnishees (R 34),
which Certificate was omitted by inadvertence and mistake. The Certificate reads as follows:
"Served the foregoing Reply to Answers of
Garnishees by mailing a copy thereof to Dale E.
Grant and Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc.,
153 East Second South, Salt Lake City, Utah and
to Thurman E. O'Neil, 122¥2 South Main Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah, this 5th day of April, 1955.
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY & SNOW
By jsj Allen M. Swan"
2. To supplement the record by designation to the
Clerk of the lower court to certify to the Supreme Court
the transcript of proceedings in the trial court on May
2, 1955, when appellants moved the trial court to vacate
dnd set aside its judgment. The existence of stenographic
notes of the entire proceedings was not known by respondent at the time of the designation of the original
record and said transcript is necessary and material to
the proper decision of the Court in that it reveals that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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appellants had actual notice of respondent's Reply to
Answers of Garnishees prior to trial.
In support of s.aid Petition and Motion, respondent
relies upon the following points :
POINT I
THE DECISION OF THE COURT DID NOT GIVE PROPER WEIGHT TO THE FACTS AND PERMISSIBLE INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN FROM THE RECORD, SINCE
SUCH RECORD, TOGETHER WITH ADMISSIONS IN APPELLANTS' BRIEF, CLEARLY REVEAL THAT APPELLANTS HAD BOTH ACTUAL NOTICE, AND IMPUTED
NOTICE, OF 'THE ISSUES TO BE TRIED IN THE TRIAL
COURT.

POINT II
RESPONDENT DID NOT OFFER PROOF OF SERVICE
OF ITS REPLY TO ANSWERS OF GARNISHEES ON 'TRIAL,
SINCE IT MISTAKENLY BELIEVED SUCH PROOF WAS
IN THE RECORD AND SINCE APPELLANTS RAISED NO
OBJECTION TO TRIAL UPON THE MERITS, AND, UNDER
')
SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THE COURT HAS POWER TO
PERMIT AMENDMENT OF PROOF OF SERVICE UNDER
THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 4 (h) AND RULE 5 (a), U. R.
C. P., TO SHOW THE TRUE FACTS.

POINT III
THE COURT'S DECISION FOLLOWED FROM ITS FINDING THAT APPELLANTS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE
REPLY TO ANSWERS OF GARNISHEES AND SINCE THE
REQUESTED SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD REVEALS AP-
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4
PELLANTS, IN TRUTH, HAD SUCH KNOWLEDGE, THE
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD SHOULD BE
GRANTED UNDER RULE 75 (h), U. R. C. P., SO THAT
ALL FACTS ARE BEFORE THE COURT.

WHEREFORE, respondent prays that its petition
for rehearing and its motion to amend and supplement the
record be granted and that upon such rehearing, and
after consideration of the complete factual record, and
all inferences therein, the decision of the Court be recalled, .and the judgement of the lower court affirmed.
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW
& CHRISTENSEN

Attorneys for Respondent

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REHEARING AND MOTION
TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD
By its reversal of the judgment on appeal, this Court
upheld appellants' claim that they had no notice of a
document entitled Reply to Answers of Garnishees prior
to the trial in the lower court, and that appellants thereby
had no notice of the issues which were to be tried.
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Respondent does not dispute the principle of law
announced by the Court, but we earnestly contend that
the principle has no proper application in this case, in
view of the facts and inferences in the record already
certified to this Court. It is believed the Court did not
fully realize the significance of many facts and that
on the former hearing and in the Brief, we did not effectively direct the Court's attention to the inesc.apable
factual inferences to be found in this record.
In order to remedy this situation, and to prevent
a manifest injustice, the following argument is respectfully submitted.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. THE DECISION OF THE COURT DID NOT GIVE
PROPER WEIGHT TO THE FACTS AND PERMISSIBLE INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN FROM THE RECORD, SINCE
SUCH RECORD, TOGETHER WITH ADMISSIONS IN APPELLANTS' BRIEF, CLEARLY REVEAL THAT APPELLANTS HAD BOTH ACTUAL NOTI·CE, AND IMPUTED
NOTICE, OF THE ISSUES TO BE TRIED IN THE TRIAL

COURT.
II. RESPONDENT DID NOT OFFER PROOF OF SERVICE OF ITS REPLY TO ANSWERS OF GARNISHEES ON
TRIAL, SINCE IT MISTAKENLY BELIEVED SUCH PROOF
WAS IN THE RECORD AND SINCE APPELLANTS RAISED
NO OBJECTION TO TRIAL UPON THE MERITS, AND,
UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THE COURT HAS POWER
TO PERMIT AMENDMENT OF PROOF OF SERVICE UN-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
DER THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 4 (h) AND RULE 5' (a),
U. R. C. P., TO SHOW THE TRUE FA·CTS.
III. 'THE COURT'S DECISION FOLLOWED FROM ITS
FINDING THAT APPELLANTS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF
THE REPLY TO ANSWERS OF GARNISHEES AND SINCE
THE REQUESTED SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD REVEALS
APPELLANTS, IN TRUTH, HAD SUCH KNOWLEDGE, THE
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD SHOULD BE
GRANTED UNDER RULE 75 (h), U. R. C. P., SO THAT ALL
FA•CTS ARE BEFORE THE COURT.

ARGUl\1:ENT
POINT I.
THE DECISION OF THE COURT DID NOT GIVE PROPER WEIGHT TO THE FACTS AND PERMISSIBLE INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN FROM THE RECORD, SINCE
SUCH RECORD, TOGE'THER WI'TH ADMISSIONS IN APPELLANTS' BRIEF, CLEARLY REVEAL THAT APPELLANTS HAD BOTH ACTUAL NOTICE, AND IMPUTED
NOTICE, OF 'THE ISSUES TO BE TRIED IN THE TRIAL
COURT.

The decision of the Court states in part:
"Although a reply to answer of garnishee was
filed, and it was admitted that it was actually
served on ... O'Neil, there was no proof ... that
such service was made on the garnishees herein,
nor was there any evidence that they had any
knowledge of it, or its contents before the hearing."
It is respectfully submitted that the Court did not
consider the cumulative effect of the many factors in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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record which, when considered together, clearly reveal
that appellants had both actual and imputed notice of
our Reply.
A summary of these factors includes the following:
(a) The notice of the garnishment hearing informed both appellants that the purpose of the he.aring
was "to determine the indebtedness, if any, due Thurman
E. O'Neil by ... " the appellants.
Obviously, Grant, acting for himself and the corporate appellant, took this notice to appellants' attorney.
It is equally obvious that counsel knew what answers
were filed by the garnishees, since the answers were prepared on his typewriter and were sworn before him as
Notary Public long before a Reply was filed (R 15).
The answers revealed no indebtedness. When counsel
received the notice of hearing, he, as a lawyer, was at
once on notice that he would be required to meet the
issue of .a claimed indebtedness. Under present rules,
many complaints in civil actions contain no more than an
allegation of indebtedness and if the defendant desires to
know more than that, discovery procedures are open to
him.
(b) While it is true that Grant was subpoenaed as
a witness by plaintiff, the record reveals he was never
called by plaintiff. After plaintiff rested, Grant, without any objection, took the stand as a party ordinarily
does, to refute respondent's case.
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Further, the subpoena served on Grant required him
to bring to court books, records and checks reflecting
the payments made by him or the Utah Cash Register
Exchange to O'Neil. A cursory examination of this subpoena by counsel obviously showed him that a hearing
encompassing the past transactions between O'Neil and
appellants would be conducted.
(c) Appellants received notice of the hearing 13
days in advance and were served with subpoena two days
before the he.aring, yet they would _have the Court believe they or their counsel made no effort to examine
the file in the District Court despite the matters described
in paragraphs (a) and (b).
(d) In addition to the above factors, appellants say,
on page 5 of their brief, that they knew of the existence
of the Reply filed by respondent although "its exact
contents were not known to them prior to the hearing.''
(Emphasis supplied).
Appellants are "hedging". Their statement is evasive and equivocal. By claiming not to know the "exact"
contents of the Reply, they cannot escape the doctrine
of imputed notice. As stated in 66 Corpus Juris Secundum, Notice, Section 11, " ... a person who has notice of
facts which would cause a reasonably prudent person
to inquire as to further f.acts is chargeable with notice
of the further facts discoverable by proper inquiry ..."
Courts have applied this doctrine to do equity and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to prevent injustice. It is ordinarily found in cases where
it would be "unconscionable ... to permit ... " a party
to assert he had no notice. 66 C.J.S., Notice, Section 11 b.
In the present case, .appellants never gave the slightest indication they were unaware of the contents of the
Reply until after the Sheriff had levied upon them pursuant to the garnishee judgment. It would be unconscionable to permit them now to assert successfully that
they didn't know the "exact" contents of the Reply and
thereby, to avoid the judgment and levy.
(e) Although Grant claims he appeared on trial
only as a witness, it is ·significant that he appeared with
counsel and sat at the opposite side of counsel table with
his counsel just as any party sits with his lawyer in the
trial of a contested matter. Direct and cross examination
of the witnesses was conducted in the same fashion as
in any trial. The record of trial is totally barren of any
claim of surprise or objection to the proceedings. No
continuance was asked. No objection was made that the
evidence sought to be elicited was immaterial or irrelevant, or otherwise beyond the scope of issues counsel
obviously intended to meet.
Finally, although appellants now vigorously assert
to this Court, through their counsel, that they didn~t
know they were to participate in a trial, that Grant appeared only as a witness, and that it w.as only later that
they realized a trial had occurred, the record reveals
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Mr. Fuller stated: "We rest, Your Honor." (emphasis
supplied) (R 93).
(f) A close examination of the questions asked by
appellants' counsel on cross examination of respondent's
witnesses .and direct examination of his own witnesses
clearly reveals an intimate knowledge of the business
affairs of all the parties to this suit and of matters and
issues being tried by the court and a genuine attempt
to meet these issues.
(g)

Appellants' contention before this Court that

they were "dumbfounded" and unaware of what was happening in the lower court is ridiculous in the face of
the following colloquy between court and counsel at the
beginning of the hearing (R 40):
"MR. SWAN: Your Honor, Mr. O'Neil is not
in court today. The party against whom we are
asking a garnishee judgment is here, Mr. Grant,
Dale Grant, whose .attorney is representing also
today Utah Cash Register Exchange, a corporation.
"THE COURT: Well, you are not taking
anything personally against Mr. Grant.
"MR SWAN: Yes, Your Honor, we are. We
have prayed for judgment in the .alternative, either
Mr. Grant or the corporation.
"THE COURT: He hasn't been garnished,
has he!
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"MR. SWAN : Yes. I think your file will
show two garnishments, Your Honor, one against
the corporate defendant and one against Grant
personally.
"THE COURT: Oh, yes, I see; and what does
he answer personally? That he owed nothing?
"Mr. SWAN: They both answered that they
were not in debt.
"MR. FULLER: However, they answered
they had some goods belonging to O'Neil in their
possession, and we disclaimed interest in those.
"THE COURT: Dale E. Grant has answered,
'No, except as stated in answers to garnishment
served on the Utah Cash Register Exchange, and
in that Dale E. Grant doesn't claim to be indebted.
"MR. FULLER: Dale Grant is president of
the Utah Cash Register Exchange.
~'THE COURT : Yes, and if they can show
that he holds any property, I suppose judgment
would be taken against him here, and you propose
to do that as against the individual?

"MR. SWAN: If it is the judge's decision
that he does owe property rather than cash or
rather than indebtedness, yes.
"THE COURT: You may proceed to try to
show what that is then."
It will be noted that Mr. Swan commented that Mr.
Fuller, .attorney for the appellants, was in court and was
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representing not only Mr. Grant, but the Ut.ah Cash
Register Exchange. Mr. Fuller made no objection to
this statement but would now have us believe he appeared only as counsel for Grant, as a witness. The
quoted colloquy, together with the record of appearances
of counsel (R 39), conclusively disproves counsel's present contention.
Then, it should be noted that Mr. Swan stated he
was .asking judgment in the alternative against either
Mr. Grant or the corporation. After further colloquy
between court and counsel concerning the proposed plan
of attack to be followed by plaintiff, the court stated,
". . . I suppose judgment would be taken against him
(Grant) here ... " (R 41).
(h) The record, at page 55, and page 64, reveals
appellants' counsel knew enough about the issues being
tried to question witnesses concerning another pending
case involving defendant O'Neil, in an effort to refute
respondent's theories. It is difficult to see how counsel
could have been better prepared than in this case.
(i) There is no showing made that appellants' position or proof would have been different on any other
hearing of these issues. We submit that unless prejudice
is shown, appellants have not sustained the burden imposed upon them to overcome the presumptively correct
decision of the lower court.
In summary, respondent contends that appellants'
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outraged cry of "lack of notice" is mere afterthought,
to escape the levy which followed judgment. We submit that parties to litigation too often submit to trial
court action without objection, with no request for continuance, with no claim of surprise or prejudice, and
when the decision is adverse, produce a carefully concealed "ace in the hole" to win a lost cause. Courts ought
not to countenance such conduct.
If, as appears clear from the record, appellants had
actual notice, they should fail in their contention now.
If they knew only that a Reply was in existence, but did
not le.arn its "exact" contents, they still should fail, for
where " . . . facts put a person on inquiry, notice will
be imputed to him if he designedly abstains from inquiry
for the purpose of avoiding notice . . . " 66 C. J. S.,
Notice, Section 11.
POINT II.
RESPONDENT DID NOT OFFER PROOF OF SERVICE
OF ITS REPLY TO ANSWERS OF GARNISHEES ON TRIAL,
SINCE IT MISTAKENLY BELIEVED SUCH PROOF WAS
IN THE RECORD AND SINCE APPELLANTS RAISED NO
OBJECTION TO TRIAL UPON THE MERITS, AND, UNDER
SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THE COURT HAS POWER TO
PERMIT AMENDMENT OF PROOF OF SERVICE UNDER
THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 4 (h) AND RULE 5 (a), U. R.
C. P., TO SHOW THE TRUE FACTS.

The record reve.als that when the trial court reached
this matter on its calenda~, the parties proceeded to in-
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quire into all phases of the matter without objection.
Respondent made no attempt to prove that it had served
the Reply to Answer of Garnishees on the appellants
because counsel for respondent believed that a Certificate
of Mailing to these partie.s was a part of the Reply and
was in the record. His belief in this regard was strengthened by the f.act that no objection was made and no request was made for a continuance.
As all lawyers know, there are many times when,
in response to a complaint, an adverse party appears in
court and, if no question is raised concerning the service
of a summons or the entry of an appearance, the party
is deemed to be "before the court" and no proof of service is offered, even if available, and such a defendant
will not be heard later to say that he had no notice of
the nature of the proceedings.
Since appellants now strenuously complain that they
had no notice and since counsel for respondent distinctly
recalls having prepared copies of the Reply for them and
recalls having had prepared envelopes in which such
copies were to be mailed, we now seek to amend the record by inserting a Certificate of Mailing as indicated in
the Motion hereinbefore set forth.
This proposed Certificate of Mailing is in accord
with the statements made to the Supreme Court by counsel upon oral argument, which statement would not have
been made to the Court in response to Mr. Justice Wade's
question if in fact no service by mail had been accomSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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plished. As the Court is no doubt aware, counsel for respondent are not in the habit of making untrue statements to the Supreme Court or to any court.

vVe view the Certificate of :Mailing and the Reply
to Answers of Garnishees as a form of process, in view
of the provisions of Rule 5 (a), U.R.C.P., which states,
in part:
" ... that pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief ... shall be served ...
in the manner provided for service of summons
in Rule 4."
Rule 4 (h), U.R.C.P., provides:
"At any time in its discretion and upon such
terms as it deems just, the Court may .allow any
process or proof of service thereof to be amended

"
While decisions construing Rule 4 (h) are not numerous, our research indicates that the rule receives a
liberal interpretation in order that the record will conform to fact. Wieland & Son v. Wickard, 68 Fed. Supp.
93, 4 Fed. Rule Dec. 250 (E. D. Wise., 1945) involved a
matter wherein service of process was required to be
made upon the Secretary of Agriculture by delivering
to him a copy of the complaint. Plaintiff's complaint
was filed with the clerk with the request that no summons
be issued, but that the defendant be served by mailing
from the office of the United States l\Iarshal. No summons was issued and no proof of mailing was _in the file.
The Court said:
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"In my opinion the court is authorized under
Rule 4h to allow the necessary procedural amendments in order that the merits of the plaintiff's
claim may be adjudicated.***
"It will be noted that under the rule the
power to allow amendments is not limited in point
of time and that it exists with reference 'to any
process' which manifestly includes such as is
legally defective. The power to amend, however,
is limited. As observed in Gagnon v. U. 8., 193
U. S. 451, 456, 24 S. Ct. 510, 511, 48 L. Ed. 745,
the power to amend must not be confounded with
the power to create. It presupposes an existing
record, which is defective by reason of some
clerical error or mistake, or the omission of some
entry which should have been made during the
progress of the case, or by the loss of some document originally filed therein. The. difference between creating and amending the record is analgous to that between the construction and repair
of a piece of personal property."
It is true that the Wieland case treats the proof of
mailing of a complaint as "proof of service of process."
In the instant case, "proof of service of process," quite accurately describes the proposed amendment which respondent by its motion to amend seeks at this time. The
absence of the Certificate of :Mailing on the Reply constitutes "an omission of some entry which should have
been made during the progress of the case," or perhaps
even more accurately, "some clerical error or mistake."
A similar result w.as reached in the case of Burdick
v. Powell Brothers, 91 Fed. Supp. 12 124 Fed. 2d 694,
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1 Fed. Rule Dec. 220 (N.D., Ill., 1940). The question
was not discussed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, but
the United States District Court for Illinois permitted
an amendment to cure a defect in the affidavit of service
of summons.
In the case of English v. Smith, 259 P. 2d 857 (1953),
the Supreme Court of Wyoming allowed ,an amendment
to the record after the dismissal of an appeal, to correct
.an erroneous date entered by the Clerk of the District
Court. In its decision the Court said:
"Generally a record cannot be amended after
dismissal of an appeal, but there are exceptions
to the general rule. * * *
"It appears to be a matter of discretion here
for this Court, in McGinnis v Beatty (citing case)
commented, 'though we hold that the Court has
jurisdiction after an order dismissing an appeal
for a defect in the record, to grant a motion to
permit an amendment of the record filed in connection with a motion to reinstate on a petition
for a rehearing it should not be understood that
such a motion then filed for the first time will be
granted in all cases or as a matter of right, but
whether it will or ought to be granted must depend
upon the facts and circumstances of the particular
case as affecting the right to amend, in view of the
delay in the application, in addition to the showing
ordinarily necessary to justify the return of a
record for amendment.' "
So far as we can determine by use of Shepard's
Citator, these cases have not been overruled or success-
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fully attacked, and respondent asserts that the principle
of the cases is correct, particularly in view of the language of Rule 4 (h), which permits the court to allow such
amendments "at any time in its discretion." Such wording clearly does not limit an amendment to a time prior
to the decision of the Supreme Court, and where, as here,
the record ought to be amended so that the true and complete facts are before the Supreme Court, we submit that
the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, should grant
the motion to allow insertion of the Certificate of Mailing on respondent's Reply to Answers of Garnishees.

POINT III.
THE COURT'S DECISION FOLLOWED FROM ITS FINDING THAT APPELLANTS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE
REPLY TO ANSWERS OF GARNISHEES AND SINCE THE
REQUESTED SUPPLEMENTAL REoCORD REVEALS APPELLANTS, IN TRUTH, HAD SUCH KNOWLEDGE, 'THE
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD SHOULD BE
GRANTED UNDER RULE 75 (h), U. R. C. P., SO THAT
ALL FACTS ARE BEFORE THE COURT.

The supplemental record which respondent desires
the Court to consider consists of a seven-page transcript
of proceedings reflecting what transpired on May 2,
1955 when appellants' motion to vacate and set aside
the garnishee judgment came on for hearing.
Respondent informs this Court that at the time the
original record was designated on appeal, it was unaware
that the court reporter in the trial court had taken stenoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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graphic notes of the colloquy between court and counsel
when appellants' motion came on for hearing May 2, 1955.
Following the decision of this Court, inquiry was made
of the court reporter, who at first .advised no such notes
had been taken, but who subsequently informed respondent's counsel that she had in fact taken notes of all
matters except legal argument, and a transcript was accordingly prepared.
Counsel for respondent were not aware of the import
of the statements by appellants' counsel until this transcript was prepared, and it was therefore impossible for
it to have been made a part of the original record.
The more significant portions of this transcript include an exchange between court and counsel wherein
it clearly appears that counsel for appellants had knowledge of the Reply to Answers of Garnishees before the
trial in the lower court. This exchange is as follows:
"MR. FULLER: Well, Your Honor, in this
matter our position is simply that there was no
reply ever served pursuant to the rules on the defendant.
"THE COURT : It may have been, and he
would have been entitled to it. He could have had
it at that time, but he didn't call my attention to
it and didn't seem to be none the worse for the
battle.
"MR. FULLER: Well, the matter of fact
is we take the position that the judgment that was
rendered exceeded what could have been granted
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under the circumstances. We felt that it sh~ould be
limited to the matter set forth in the reply. If you
will recall and will check the record, the defendant
was called to court on a subpoena. He had no attorney prior to that time.
"THE COURT: Didn't he have .an attorney
in here that day~
"MR. FULLER: I was here that day.
"THE COURT: Yes.
"MR. FULLER: Prior to that time. And I
specifically asked the witness Snyder - now, I
had knowledge that there was a reply and answer.
It was served on O'Neil and also on his attorney.
And I specifically asked Snyder at that hearing
whether they were trying to assert a fifty per
cent ownership as set forth in that reply, and he
said absolutely, there was no such an understanding.
"THE COURT: I ruled against him on that,
didn't I~
"MR. FULLER :

Pardon~

"THE COURT: Didn't I rule .against him on
thatf
"MR. FULLER: You didn't have to rule
on that.
"THE COURT: Oh.
"MR. FULLER: And I assumed at that time
that they were not then proceeding on the basis
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of this so-called reply that had been filed; and
when Your Honor ruled on this alter ego business, I think that far exceeded what was set forth
in the notice that came out. I think Your Honor
shouldn't have ruled as you did because I don't
believe we were fully apprised of that aspect of
the proceedings. In any event, I think there was
enough surprise that came into the matter that
we didn't really know which theory they were
proceeding on at the hearing." (Italics ours)
This exchange makes it clear that counsel for appellants not only knew that there was a reply prior to
the hearing, but knew of its contents. Mr. Fuller mentions the partnership theory, states that he asked the
witness Snyder at the hearing concerning the theory, received an answer which apparently disproved the existence of a partnership and then ".assumed that the plaintiff was not proceeding on the basis of the reply that had
been filed."
The rule on which respondent relies as a basis to
supplement the record is Rule 75 (h), U.R.C.P., the material portions of which read as follows:
"If anything material to either party is omitted from the record on appeal by error or accident ... the Suprrme Court on a proper suggestion, or on its own initiative, may direct that the
omission . . . shall be corrected and if necessary
that a supplemental record shall be certified and
transmitted by the Clerk of the District Court."
This rule is substantially the same as Federal Rule
75 (h), which has been construed by the courts to allow a
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. record to be supplemented in order to include any portion of the proceedings in the lower court which may
be material or necessary to a proper disposition of the
case on appeal.
This Court has construed Rule 75 (h) in the case
of Boskovich v. Utah Construction Company, 259 P. 2d
885 (1953). In that case this Court allowed a correction of the record to show a certain statement of the
trial court at the time of hearing. The Court stated, at
page 888 : "The correction of the record was properly
made even though not made until after the record had
been transmitted on appeal to this court, under the
authority of Rule 75 (h) which was purposely made
broad enough by the Committee on Rules to cover any
situation requiring remedial action to present a complete and accurate record of proceedings below."
The Boskovich case cites with approval Dempsey v.
Guaranty Trust Company of New York, 131 F. 2d 103,
wherein the Circuit Court of the 7th Circuit states:
"It is clear that the purpose of this part of
Rule 75 (75 h) was to provide a simple method
of adding to the record on appeal any matter properly a part thereof which had been omitted therefrom by error or accident, and that such addition
would be made even .after the record had been
transmitted to the court of appeals. The rule,
however, was never intended to permit the addition of. matter not before the District Court
when he entered his order."
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The Arizona Supreme Court has construed its Rule
which appears to be identical to Federal Rule 75 (h) in
the case of Hughes v. Young, 123 P. 2d 396, 138 A.L.R.
943, .and states the following:
"This is a provision of the new rules which
was intended to obviate the necessity of a judgment being affirmed on account of the fact that
a complete record of the proceedings in the lower
court was not before this court, when, if such record was brought up, it would show that the
judgment should be reversed. The rule is obviously in the interest of justice and to permit
affirmance due to the inadvertence of counsel in
completing the record in this court and should
be liberally construed, but there are limits to its
application. We may by virtue thereof have any
records of proceedings of the lower court which
has been omitted from the court on appeal,
brought before us at any time if we think it is
necessary in order to do justice on the merits of
the case, but we may not supply evidence which
was never presented to the lower court even
though it may be that such evidence is in existence
somewhere." (italics ours).
The rule has also been construed to .allow the record
to be corrected where, as here, the decision of the appellate court has already been rendered.

American Chemical Paint Company v. Dow Chemical
Company, 164 F. 2d 208 (Cir. Ct. of App. 6th, 1947), is
a case in which a p.arty moved for a correction of the
record at the time a petition for rehearing was filed,
which motion .asked for the Circuit Court to order the
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District Court to certify a transcript of a proceeding had
in the lower court, in which the appellant allegedly
waived a p.articular question of law by the admission of
its counsel. In that case the proceedings deemed material
were not a part of the original transcript of the_ record
when the appeal was considered due to the fact that the
parties stipulated in prep.aring the record on appeal that
it be omitted. The appellate court entered an order subsequent to its decision and opinion that the oral argument
in the court below appeared material to the disposition of
the appeal, and that pursu.ant to the provisions of Rule
75 (h), Rules of Civil Procedure, a supplemental record
containing a transcript of the argument be certified and
transmitted by the Clerk of the District Court to the
Clerk of the Circuit Court. The appellant contended
that the supplemental record was not properly before
the Circuit Court, the .argument being that Rule 75 (h)
permitted the appellate court to order a supplemental
record if anything material to either party "is omitted
from the record on appeal by error or accident, or is
misstated therein," and that none of those conditions
existed in that the omission of the transcript of .argument was deliberate and by agreement. The Circuit
Court stated:
"We believe that the rule is broad enough to
cover a case of this kind, and that when the parties, acting in good faith in .an attempt to eliminate
portions of the record erroneously believed at the
time to be irrevelant, have omitted a portion of
the record considered by the appellate court to
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be material to a proper disposition of the appeal,
the court may direct that the omitted portion be
supplied in order to make a proper disposition of
the question presented."
In the light of these authorities, there can be no
doubt that the Court has the power, and, indeed the duty,
to require the supplemental record to be brought before
it.
If this be done, there will remain no doubt that the
parties knew what the issues were, that the matter was
fully tried without objection or claim of surprise, and
the issues were investigated and tried by the trial judge
as thoroughly as could have been done under any circumstances.
In support of the lower court, it should be noted
that, contrary to the assertion in appellants' brief (page
10), the court did not rule peremptorily, but heard argument after a recess, before the decision was announced.
In this argument, appellants at no time raised the objections which are now so thoroughly asserted.
As Mr. Justice Cardozo stated, in Doty v. Love, 295
U. S. 64, 79 L. Ed. 1303 (1934) :
"Finally the appellants say that the proceedings in the court of chancery are void, for insufficient notice to the depositors and others. A sufficient answer is that the appellants appeared
generally and were fully heard upon the merits."
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It is respondent's position that the appearance by
appellants at the hearing and their complete and wholehearted participation therein without objection before,
during or .after the evidence was heard, constituted a
waiver of any defect which may have occurred in· procedures prior to that time.
We have mentioned waiver at this point in the argument because it is our earnest belief that the proposed
supplemental record amply emphasizes that appellants
did not make objection because they did not find anything objectionable until they experienced the weight of
judgment and a levy of goods thereunder.
Since the supplemental transcript clearly shows that
counsel for appellants not only knew of the existence of
the Reply, but w.as aware of the theories contained in it,
the Court ought to grant the motion to supplement the
record so that its decision will not be based upon half
truths, but will clearly reflect all matters on which the
trial court's judgment depended.
CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in this case quotes an excerpt
from National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co.,
v. Thompson, ______ Utah ______ , 286 P. 2d 249, which states,
in part, ". . . if an issue is to be tried and a party's
rights concluded with respect thereto, he must have notice
thereof and an opportunity to meet it."
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That comment referred to Rule 15 (b), U.R.C.P.,
and the Court noted that, contrary to the rule, there was
no "express or implied assent" to try the issue of value.
This is not such a case. The quoted principle is
good law, but is not the controlling principle here, where
both the original record, and the proposed supplement,
show clearly an implied consent to try the issues involved.
The principle applicable in the present case is to be
found in the portion of Rule 54 (c) (1), quoted also by
this Court in Morris v. Russell, 236 P. 2d 451: " ... every
final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party
... is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such
relief in his pleadings ... "
The trial judge here obviously granted the relief
he thought the evidence required. He was faced with
no objections of any kind regarding notice. This Court's
insistence that he nevertheless committed reversible error
would result in most substantial injustice, and the decision of the Court should therefore be recalled and the
entire matter reheard.
Respectfully submitted,
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW
& CHRISTENSEN
JOHN H. SNOW
.Attorneys for Respondent
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